Peer-Reviewed Publications
How Exile Shapes Online Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela (w/ Alexandra Siegel) American Political Science Review (2023)
[Published Version][Final Version]
How does exile affect online dissent? We argue that exile not only fragments opposition movements but fundamentally alters how they express opposition, because it internationalizes their networks and removes them from day-to-day life under the regime. Providing the first large-scale, quantitative study of the effects of exile on online dissent, we show that after exile Venezuelan activists 1) increase discussion of and support for foreign-led solutions to Venezuela’s political and economic crisis—including military intervention, sanctions, and diplomacy; 2) decrease discussion of local political dynamics; and 3) express harsher criticisms of the Maduro regime. Our analysis of over 5 million tweets sent by 357 activists over seven years suggests that the internationalization of networks is one mechanism by which exile shapes how activists communicate. After exile, activists increase their interactions with foreign entities and international actors and tweet in English at higher rates. Providing temporally granular individual-level measures of activists’ behavior, this work contributes to our understanding of the relationship between exile—one of the most ubiquitous yet understudied forms of repression—and dissent in the digital age.
How does exile affect online dissent? We argue that exile not only fragments opposition movements but fundamentally alters how they express opposition, because it internationalizes their networks and removes them from day-to-day life under the regime. Providing the first large-scale, quantitative study of the effects of exile on online dissent, we show that after exile Venezuelan activists 1) increase discussion of and support for foreign-led solutions to Venezuela’s political and economic crisis—including military intervention, sanctions, and diplomacy; 2) decrease discussion of local political dynamics; and 3) express harsher criticisms of the Maduro regime. Our analysis of over 5 million tweets sent by 357 activists over seven years suggests that the internationalization of networks is one mechanism by which exile shapes how activists communicate. After exile, activists increase their interactions with foreign entities and international actors and tweet in English at higher rates. Providing temporally granular individual-level measures of activists’ behavior, this work contributes to our understanding of the relationship between exile—one of the most ubiquitous yet understudied forms of repression—and dissent in the digital age.
Covert Confiscation: How Governments Differ in Their Strategies of Expropriation (with Rebecca Perlman) Comparative Political Studies (2022)
[Final Version][Published Version]
A substantial literature concludes that democratic-type institutions curb governments' propensity to expropriate foreign direct investment. However, little attention has been paid to the strategies of expropriation regimes employ. We theorize that more politically constrained regimes will utilize expropriation methods that help them overcome institutional impediments. Using data on expropriations in developing countries between 1960 and 2014, we show that rather than rely on the most direct and overt forms of expropriation, constrained regimes tend to use more indirect and covert methods, such as forced sale or contract renegotiation, tools which can be harder to identify, easier to justify, and frequently face lower legislative approval hurdles. Indeed, while more politically constrained regimes are less likely to overtly expropriate foreign investment than less constrained regimes, they are nearly as likely to do so covertly, introducing new questions about the extent to which institutional constraints really translate into improved protections for foreign investors.
A substantial literature concludes that democratic-type institutions curb governments' propensity to expropriate foreign direct investment. However, little attention has been paid to the strategies of expropriation regimes employ. We theorize that more politically constrained regimes will utilize expropriation methods that help them overcome institutional impediments. Using data on expropriations in developing countries between 1960 and 2014, we show that rather than rely on the most direct and overt forms of expropriation, constrained regimes tend to use more indirect and covert methods, such as forced sale or contract renegotiation, tools which can be harder to identify, easier to justify, and frequently face lower legislative approval hurdles. Indeed, while more politically constrained regimes are less likely to overtly expropriate foreign investment than less constrained regimes, they are nearly as likely to do so covertly, introducing new questions about the extent to which institutional constraints really translate into improved protections for foreign investors.
Anticipating Dissent: The Repression of Politicians in Pinochet's Chile Journal of Politics (2021)
[Final Version][Published Version]
Dictators can choose not only whether to repress but also how to repress. This paper demonstrates that autocrats select their repressive methods based on the anticipated likelihood of responsive dissent. While dictators would prefer to use violence against their most prominent opposition, the more visible the opponent, the more likely their death or detention will provoke backlash. Instead, dictators can target these enemies with alternative methods of repression like exile. To test this theory, I draw on original data on the fates of candidates in the last elections before Chile’s coup. While elected politicians experienced more repression when accounting for exile, results—including those of a regression discontinuity—demonstrate that election decreased the likelihood of suffering violence. Evidence suggests that this is due to the increased prominence associated with winning office. My findings offer new insight into how autocrats avoid backlash, as well as when they adopt different repressive tools.
Dictators can choose not only whether to repress but also how to repress. This paper demonstrates that autocrats select their repressive methods based on the anticipated likelihood of responsive dissent. While dictators would prefer to use violence against their most prominent opposition, the more visible the opponent, the more likely their death or detention will provoke backlash. Instead, dictators can target these enemies with alternative methods of repression like exile. To test this theory, I draw on original data on the fates of candidates in the last elections before Chile’s coup. While elected politicians experienced more repression when accounting for exile, results—including those of a regression discontinuity—demonstrate that election decreased the likelihood of suffering violence. Evidence suggests that this is due to the increased prominence associated with winning office. My findings offer new insight into how autocrats avoid backlash, as well as when they adopt different repressive tools.
Censorship as Reward: Evidence from Pop Culture Censorship in Chile American Political Science Review (2020)
[Final Version][Published Version]
Censorship has traditionally been understood as a way for dictators to silence opposition. By contrast, this article develops and tests the theory that certain forms of censorship—in particular, prohibitions on popular culture—serve not only to limit political information but also to reward dictators’ supporters. Using text analysis of all 8,000 films reviewed for distribution during Chile’s dictatorship, I demonstrate that rather than focusing only on sensitive political topics, censors banned movies containing content considered immoral. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence, I show that these patterns cannot be explained by masked political content, distributor self-censorship, or censor preferences. Instead, they reflect the regime’s use of censorship as a reward for supporters, particularly conservative Catholic groups. My findings suggest that even repressive measures can be used in part to maintain support for authoritarian regimes.
Censorship has traditionally been understood as a way for dictators to silence opposition. By contrast, this article develops and tests the theory that certain forms of censorship—in particular, prohibitions on popular culture—serve not only to limit political information but also to reward dictators’ supporters. Using text analysis of all 8,000 films reviewed for distribution during Chile’s dictatorship, I demonstrate that rather than focusing only on sensitive political topics, censors banned movies containing content considered immoral. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence, I show that these patterns cannot be explained by masked political content, distributor self-censorship, or censor preferences. Instead, they reflect the regime’s use of censorship as a reward for supporters, particularly conservative Catholic groups. My findings suggest that even repressive measures can be used in part to maintain support for authoritarian regimes.
Democracy's Effect on Terrorist Organizations: Regime Type and Armed Group Behavior in Chile Terrorism and Political Violence (2015)
[Published Version]
How does democracy influence terrorism? The regime-responsive school argues that lack of representation in autocracies motivates violence; the regime-permissive school posits that individual liberty in democracies allows it. The schools thus disagree about the democratic feature to which violence responds—representation or individual liberty. These arguments are problematic in two ways. First, neither accounts for the potentially competing effects of different democratic features. Second, treating terrorism as a set response to operating context ignores the operational processes behind violence, described in organizational theories of terrorism. This article develops a bridge between the regime-responsive and regime-permissive schools by applying organizational theories of terrorism to their key arguments. I argue that representation and individual liberty have independent, and sometimes competing, effects on armed groups' missions, hierarchies, and membership—collectively organizational capacity, the ability to survive and influence the environment. This explains the mixed effects of democracy on terrorism: both high-functioning democracy and repressive autocracy weaken organizational capacity, but decreased representation in a democracy or higher individual liberty in an autocracy removes organizational stresses. New research on Chile between 1965 and 1995—representing five government periods, with four armed groups operating—acts as an initial test of these relationships.
How does democracy influence terrorism? The regime-responsive school argues that lack of representation in autocracies motivates violence; the regime-permissive school posits that individual liberty in democracies allows it. The schools thus disagree about the democratic feature to which violence responds—representation or individual liberty. These arguments are problematic in two ways. First, neither accounts for the potentially competing effects of different democratic features. Second, treating terrorism as a set response to operating context ignores the operational processes behind violence, described in organizational theories of terrorism. This article develops a bridge between the regime-responsive and regime-permissive schools by applying organizational theories of terrorism to their key arguments. I argue that representation and individual liberty have independent, and sometimes competing, effects on armed groups' missions, hierarchies, and membership—collectively organizational capacity, the ability to survive and influence the environment. This explains the mixed effects of democracy on terrorism: both high-functioning democracy and repressive autocracy weaken organizational capacity, but decreased representation in a democracy or higher individual liberty in an autocracy removes organizational stresses. New research on Chile between 1965 and 1995—representing five government periods, with four armed groups operating—acts as an initial test of these relationships.
Invited Contributions
"Review Article of After Authoritarianism: Transitional Justice and Democratic Stability by Monika Nalepa," Political Science Quarterly (2023).
"Book Review of Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts by Fiona Shen-Bayh," The Journal of Development Studies (2023).
"Book Review of Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts by Fiona Shen-Bayh," The Journal of Development Studies (2023).
Policy Writing
Social Media Data in Conflict Research (with Nejla Asimovic). Institute for Research on the Information Environment. 2022.
Why Mexico's Kingpin Strategy Failed. Modern War Institute at West Point. 2022.
Crime in Pieces: The Effects of Mexico's War on Drugs, Explained. International Crisis Group. 2022.
Keeping Oil From the Fire: Tackling Mexico's Fuel Theft Racket. International Crisis Group. 2022.
What the Facebook Whistleblower Reveals and Social Media and Conflict. International Crisis Group. 2021.
All The President's Trolls: Real and Fake Twitter Fights in El Salvador. International Crisis Group. 2020.
Miracle or Mirage? Gangs and Plunging Violence in El Salvador (Data Analysis). International Crisis Group. 2020.
More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico's Crime Rings. International Crisis Group. 2020.
In Transition to Civilian Rule, Myanmar Can Learn from Chile. World Politics Review. 2013.
Reviving American Leadership (with Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright). Campaign 2012, ed. Benjamin Wittes (Brookings Institution Press 2012)
Why Mexico's Kingpin Strategy Failed. Modern War Institute at West Point. 2022.
Crime in Pieces: The Effects of Mexico's War on Drugs, Explained. International Crisis Group. 2022.
Keeping Oil From the Fire: Tackling Mexico's Fuel Theft Racket. International Crisis Group. 2022.
What the Facebook Whistleblower Reveals and Social Media and Conflict. International Crisis Group. 2021.
All The President's Trolls: Real and Fake Twitter Fights in El Salvador. International Crisis Group. 2020.
Miracle or Mirage? Gangs and Plunging Violence in El Salvador (Data Analysis). International Crisis Group. 2020.
More Than Cartels: Counting Mexico's Crime Rings. International Crisis Group. 2020.
In Transition to Civilian Rule, Myanmar Can Learn from Chile. World Politics Review. 2013.
Reviving American Leadership (with Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright). Campaign 2012, ed. Benjamin Wittes (Brookings Institution Press 2012)