Working Papers
The Repression of Cultural Elites: Evidence from Argentina's Film Industry
[Working paper]
Cultural elites, from athletes to artists, pose unique challenges for dictators: they may use their platforms to publicly criticize the regime, but violently repressing them draws unwanted attention to human rights abuses. This article explores one means of silencing such figures -- employment bans. I argue that bans aim to reduce the reach of prominent cultural elites, limiting their audience even if they dissent. I support this theory with rich quantitative and qualitative evidence from the archives of Argentina's military dictatorship (1976-1983). Matching lists of banned artists with detailed career data from the film industry, I first show that the regime targeted more prominent cultural figures. Bans reduced their public visibility, pushing them into spaces with smaller domestic audiences, like independent theater. Consequently, when they did dissent, few witnessed it. My findings expand our understanding of dictators' repressive repertoires, as well as highlighting how and why autocrats reshape popular culture.
Cultural elites, from athletes to artists, pose unique challenges for dictators: they may use their platforms to publicly criticize the regime, but violently repressing them draws unwanted attention to human rights abuses. This article explores one means of silencing such figures -- employment bans. I argue that bans aim to reduce the reach of prominent cultural elites, limiting their audience even if they dissent. I support this theory with rich quantitative and qualitative evidence from the archives of Argentina's military dictatorship (1976-1983). Matching lists of banned artists with detailed career data from the film industry, I first show that the regime targeted more prominent cultural figures. Bans reduced their public visibility, pushing them into spaces with smaller domestic audiences, like independent theater. Consequently, when they did dissent, few witnessed it. My findings expand our understanding of dictators' repressive repertoires, as well as highlighting how and why autocrats reshape popular culture.
Beyond Farenheit 451 (with Eunji Kim)
Abstract coming soon
Agents of Judicial Repression (w/ Fiona Shen Bayh)
[Paper available on request]
What causes fragmentation in criminal conflicts? Mexico's "drug war" has become increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large, organized cartels. However, this has made it difficult to quantitatively document when and why fragmentation occurs. This article uses novel, municipal-level data on more than 500 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020 to explore when groups emerge or expand their territory. Developed from narcoblogs, anonymous citizen journalism websites, I use this dataset to test two prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented. First, I show that negative shocks -- the capture of kingpins -- are correlated with more groups, both large and small, operating in the affected organization's territories. However, these effects persist only for smaller outfits, in part because major cartels become increasingly decentralized. Second, I show that positive shocks -- here energy sector liberalization, which increased the profitability of fuel theft -- attracted both large and small groups to affected municipalities, and did not lead to decentralization. These findings point to the benefits of disaggregating types of criminal actors, advancing our understanding of conflict and fragmentation.
What causes fragmentation in criminal conflicts? Mexico's "drug war" has become increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large, organized cartels. However, this has made it difficult to quantitatively document when and why fragmentation occurs. This article uses novel, municipal-level data on more than 500 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020 to explore when groups emerge or expand their territory. Developed from narcoblogs, anonymous citizen journalism websites, I use this dataset to test two prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented. First, I show that negative shocks -- the capture of kingpins -- are correlated with more groups, both large and small, operating in the affected organization's territories. However, these effects persist only for smaller outfits, in part because major cartels become increasingly decentralized. Second, I show that positive shocks -- here energy sector liberalization, which increased the profitability of fuel theft -- attracted both large and small groups to affected municipalities, and did not lead to decentralization. These findings point to the benefits of disaggregating types of criminal actors, advancing our understanding of conflict and fragmentation.
Reel Politik: The Hollywood Blacklist and Democratic Repression
[Paper available upon request]
Can politicians in democracies punish citizens for political beliefs, despite civil liberties protections? If so, how? I argue that politicians partner with radical non-governmental groups for the purpose of political suppression. I test this theory with evidence from the ``Hollywood Blacklist" of the 1950s, which developed from the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Pairing archival records with an online movie database, I first establish that being named during committee proceedings had significant negative impacts on victims. The committee also had a broader chilling effect on political themes in film. Qualitative and quantitative evidence shows how Congress partnered with radical anti-communist groups to enforce and grow the lists, through pressure campaigns that threatened boycotts and picketing. As a result, the lists primarily impacted visible onscreen talent. That these efforts were significantly more effective than past attempts by non-governmental groups highlights the role of politicians in empowering civil society. My results have implications for how even strong democratic institutions can be misused.
Can politicians in democracies punish citizens for political beliefs, despite civil liberties protections? If so, how? I argue that politicians partner with radical non-governmental groups for the purpose of political suppression. I test this theory with evidence from the ``Hollywood Blacklist" of the 1950s, which developed from the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Pairing archival records with an online movie database, I first establish that being named during committee proceedings had significant negative impacts on victims. The committee also had a broader chilling effect on political themes in film. Qualitative and quantitative evidence shows how Congress partnered with radical anti-communist groups to enforce and grow the lists, through pressure campaigns that threatened boycotts and picketing. As a result, the lists primarily impacted visible onscreen talent. That these efforts were significantly more effective than past attempts by non-governmental groups highlights the role of politicians in empowering civil society. My results have implications for how even strong democratic institutions can be misused.
Repression and Cultural Memory: Individual-Level Evidence from Argentina
[Working paper available on request]
Recent literature establishes that authoritarian repression has long-term political effects at both the individual and community level. I extend this research by documenting how repression influences the politics of memory. I argue that individuals targeted by the dictatorship should engage more in activities aimed at addressing the authoritarian past, due to both individual motivation and structural factors. I test this theory in the case of Argentina, by matching archival data on repression with IMDb information on careers. I provide evidence that artists targeted by the government were more likely to produce movies and television that addressed the authoritarian past post-democratization. These results are not only due to ideology: results persist even when considering only artists deemed by the secret police to have similar ideological backgrounds. My findings demonstrate how repression shapes the production of national memory at the individual-level.
Recent literature establishes that authoritarian repression has long-term political effects at both the individual and community level. I extend this research by documenting how repression influences the politics of memory. I argue that individuals targeted by the dictatorship should engage more in activities aimed at addressing the authoritarian past, due to both individual motivation and structural factors. I test this theory in the case of Argentina, by matching archival data on repression with IMDb information on careers. I provide evidence that artists targeted by the government were more likely to produce movies and television that addressed the authoritarian past post-democratization. These results are not only due to ideology: results persist even when considering only artists deemed by the secret police to have similar ideological backgrounds. My findings demonstrate how repression shapes the production of national memory at the individual-level.
The Audience of Repression: Killings and Disappearances in Pinochet's Chile
[Working paper]
Authoritarianism literature emphasizes that repression suppresses dissent, while co- optation builds support. This paper theorizes that repression can serve not just to eliminate opposition, but to appeal to supporters. I argue that regimes can use political killings to justify rule, by demonstrating a danger to the state that requires authoritarian controls to manage. I test this with evidence from Chile, where the military government enjoyed support on the basis of fighting an exaggerated communist threat. Original data on the regime’s 3,000 victims shows that killings were more likely in high-support areas – wealthy, conservative districts – but targeted suspicious individuals, signaling a direct threat to supporters. Evidence additionally shows that repression increased in high-support areas following a negative shock to support; public arrests were more likely in high-support districts; and the regime fabricated subversive activities to inflate threat. By incorporating authoritarian supporters, this research improves our understanding of subnational patterns of violence.
Authoritarianism literature emphasizes that repression suppresses dissent, while co- optation builds support. This paper theorizes that repression can serve not just to eliminate opposition, but to appeal to supporters. I argue that regimes can use political killings to justify rule, by demonstrating a danger to the state that requires authoritarian controls to manage. I test this with evidence from Chile, where the military government enjoyed support on the basis of fighting an exaggerated communist threat. Original data on the regime’s 3,000 victims shows that killings were more likely in high-support areas – wealthy, conservative districts – but targeted suspicious individuals, signaling a direct threat to supporters. Evidence additionally shows that repression increased in high-support areas following a negative shock to support; public arrests were more likely in high-support districts; and the regime fabricated subversive activities to inflate threat. By incorporating authoritarian supporters, this research improves our understanding of subnational patterns of violence.
Chileno: ¿Tú Eres Marxista? 1984