Working Papers
Employment Denial as Repression: Evidence from Argentina's Film Industry
[Working paper]
This paper explores the individual-level effects of a common form of repression: employment restriction. To do so, I match members of the film industry who appeared on the Argentine dictatorship's artistic ``black lists'' -- which limited career opportunities for suspected communists between 1976 and 1982 -- to their online movie database pages. Compared to other Argentine cast and crew, inclusion on the list is associated with fewer roles, partially moderated by working abroad. However, it is also associated with more backlash: after the dictatorship ended, targeted artists were more likely to be involved in movies dealing with authoritarianism. Additional results suggest this is not entirely due to ideology. Results offer new evidence on the impact of even non-violent forms of repression.
This paper explores the individual-level effects of a common form of repression: employment restriction. To do so, I match members of the film industry who appeared on the Argentine dictatorship's artistic ``black lists'' -- which limited career opportunities for suspected communists between 1976 and 1982 -- to their online movie database pages. Compared to other Argentine cast and crew, inclusion on the list is associated with fewer roles, partially moderated by working abroad. However, it is also associated with more backlash: after the dictatorship ended, targeted artists were more likely to be involved in movies dealing with authoritarianism. Additional results suggest this is not entirely due to ideology. Results offer new evidence on the impact of even non-violent forms of repression.
Criminal Fragmentation in Mexico
[Working Paper]
Mexico’s "war on drugs" is increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large cartels. However, understanding such fragmentation is challenging precisely be- cause of the number of actors involved. This research note introduces data on more than 450 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020. I use the dataset to test prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented: following the removal of kingpins, and in response to profit opportunities (here, fuel theft). Both are associated with more groups operating in affected regions, with king- pin removals correlating with the emergence of new groups and profit opportunities attracting existing organizations. This research contributes to our understanding of criminal control and informs debates over policies aimed at reducing violence.
Mexico’s "war on drugs" is increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large cartels. However, understanding such fragmentation is challenging precisely be- cause of the number of actors involved. This research note introduces data on more than 450 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020. I use the dataset to test prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented: following the removal of kingpins, and in response to profit opportunities (here, fuel theft). Both are associated with more groups operating in affected regions, with king- pin removals correlating with the emergence of new groups and profit opportunities attracting existing organizations. This research contributes to our understanding of criminal control and informs debates over policies aimed at reducing violence.
Agents of Judicial Repression (w/ Fiona Shen Bayh)
[Paper available on request]
What causes fragmentation in criminal conflicts? Mexico's "drug war" has become increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large, organized cartels. However, this has made it difficult to quantitatively document when and why fragmentation occurs. This article uses novel, municipal-level data on more than 500 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020 to explore when groups emerge or expand their territory. Developed from narcoblogs, anonymous citizen journalism websites, I use this dataset to test two prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented. First, I show that negative shocks -- the capture of kingpins -- are correlated with more groups, both large and small, operating in the affected organization's territories. However, these effects persist only for smaller outfits, in part because major cartels become increasingly decentralized. Second, I show that positive shocks -- here energy sector liberalization, which increased the profitability of fuel theft -- attracted both large and small groups to affected municipalities, and did not lead to decentralization. These findings point to the benefits of disaggregating types of criminal actors, advancing our understanding of conflict and fragmentation.
What causes fragmentation in criminal conflicts? Mexico's "drug war" has become increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large, organized cartels. However, this has made it difficult to quantitatively document when and why fragmentation occurs. This article uses novel, municipal-level data on more than 500 criminal groups operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020 to explore when groups emerge or expand their territory. Developed from narcoblogs, anonymous citizen journalism websites, I use this dataset to test two prominent theories about when criminal landscapes become more fragmented. First, I show that negative shocks -- the capture of kingpins -- are correlated with more groups, both large and small, operating in the affected organization's territories. However, these effects persist only for smaller outfits, in part because major cartels become increasingly decentralized. Second, I show that positive shocks -- here energy sector liberalization, which increased the profitability of fuel theft -- attracted both large and small groups to affected municipalities, and did not lead to decentralization. These findings point to the benefits of disaggregating types of criminal actors, advancing our understanding of conflict and fragmentation.
The Audience of Repression: Killings and Disappearances in Pinochet's Chile
[Working Paper]
Authoritarianism literature emphasizes that repression suppresses dissent, while co- optation builds support. This paper theorizes that repression can serve not just to eliminate opposition, but to appeal to supporters. I argue that regimes can use political killings to justify rule, by demonstrating a danger to the state that requires authoritarian controls to manage. I test this with evidence from Chile, where the military government enjoyed support on the basis of fighting an exaggerated communist threat. Original data on the regime’s 3,000 victims shows that killings were more likely in high-support areas – wealthy, conservative districts – but targeted suspicious individuals, signaling a direct threat to supporters. Evidence additionally shows that repression increased in high-support areas following a negative shock to support; public arrests were more likely in high-support districts; and the regime fabricated subversive activities to inflate threat. By incorporating authoritarian supporters, this research improves our understanding of subnational patterns of violence.
The Stability of Criminal Justice Policy Views: Evaluating the Effects of Factual Corrections and Appeals to Social Identity (w/ Jonathan Mummolo and Sean Westwood)
[Working Paper]
Recent protests have brought criminal justice to the forefront of U.S. politics. Moving preferences on policies like mandatory minimums, however, remains a central challenge to widespread reform. Across six experiments (N > 11, 000), we show that changing criminal justice policy preferences remains difficult. A common explanation for widespread support for punitive policy is that most Americans believe crime is rising even during periods of decline. However, we find while the public is willing to accept factual corrections about crime rates, this never prompts reconsideration of policy opinions. Additional experiments deploying common persuasive designs show co-partisan elite cues have no effect, but individuals update their opinions when factual corrections are combined with forced consideration of opposition views or when pressured by in-group members. These interventions are cognitively burdensome, logistically challenging to scale and produce only small effects. Policy preferences are movable, but simple information treatments are ineffective, complicating criminal justice reform.
Recent protests have brought criminal justice to the forefront of U.S. politics. Moving preferences on policies like mandatory minimums, however, remains a central challenge to widespread reform. Across six experiments (N > 11, 000), we show that changing criminal justice policy preferences remains difficult. A common explanation for widespread support for punitive policy is that most Americans believe crime is rising even during periods of decline. However, we find while the public is willing to accept factual corrections about crime rates, this never prompts reconsideration of policy opinions. Additional experiments deploying common persuasive designs show co-partisan elite cues have no effect, but individuals update their opinions when factual corrections are combined with forced consideration of opposition views or when pressured by in-group members. These interventions are cognitively burdensome, logistically challenging to scale and produce only small effects. Policy preferences are movable, but simple information treatments are ineffective, complicating criminal justice reform.
Chileno: ¿Tú Eres Marxista? 1984