Working Papers
It's What's on the Inside That Counts: Censorship of the Foreign Press in Portugal's Estado Novo
In progress.
America Above 451◦F: Book Bans in U.S. School (with Eunji Kim)
Polarization in the United States manifests in heated battles over books, with conservative parents and politicians limiting students' access to stories about people of color and LGBTQ+ individuals. What explains such censorship? This research note first establishes that book bans are more common in competitive districts, rather than conservative ones. However, understanding the significance of this finding requires knowing how access to books varies locally: offending content may simply not appear in conservative areas. We use data on school library holdings, matched with content descriptions from a crowdsourced book review platform, to show there are minimal partisan differences in library collections. This, coupled with the observation that far-right parent groups are more active in competitive area, suggests that censorship in America is primarily a response to perceived political threats. Open access to information is increasingly compromised for political expediency, carrying troubling implications for education as a pathway to democratic life.
Logics of Political Justice: Evidence from Spain's Tribunal of Public Order, 1963-1976 (w/ Fiona Shen Bayh)
[Paper available on request]
How do authoritarian regimes balance coercion with legitimacy when prosecuting political opponents? While political trials are often seen as window dressing for repression, their legitimacy is plausible only when outcomes are uncertain and processes are regularized --- features that constrain coercive control. We argue that dictators can front-load punishment through harsh pretrial detention while using judicial leniency and media control to project an image of fairness. We test this theory using novel data on political prosecutions under General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (1939–1975), drawing on original archives documenting all cases tried by the regime’s Tribunal for Public Order (TOP) and a dataset of contemporaneous state media coverage. We find that judges frequently deviated from prosecutorial recommendations and that acquittals were common, yet nearly all defendants endured extended pretrial detention. State-affiliated media highlighted judicial leniency and emphasized cases involving organized dissent, under-reporting more spontaneous acts of opposition. These findings demonstrate how autocrats can publicly perform legitimacy to obfuscate repression.
How do authoritarian regimes balance coercion with legitimacy when prosecuting political opponents? While political trials are often seen as window dressing for repression, their legitimacy is plausible only when outcomes are uncertain and processes are regularized --- features that constrain coercive control. We argue that dictators can front-load punishment through harsh pretrial detention while using judicial leniency and media control to project an image of fairness. We test this theory using novel data on political prosecutions under General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (1939–1975), drawing on original archives documenting all cases tried by the regime’s Tribunal for Public Order (TOP) and a dataset of contemporaneous state media coverage. We find that judges frequently deviated from prosecutorial recommendations and that acquittals were common, yet nearly all defendants endured extended pretrial detention. State-affiliated media highlighted judicial leniency and emphasized cases involving organized dissent, under-reporting more spontaneous acts of opposition. These findings demonstrate how autocrats can publicly perform legitimacy to obfuscate repression.
Reel Politik: Political Persecution and the "Hollywood Blacklist"
[Paper available upon request]
Can politicians in democracies punish citizens for political beliefs, despite civil liberties protections? If so, how? I argue that politicians partner with radical non-governmental groups for the purpose of political suppression. I test this theory with evidence from the ``Hollywood Blacklist" of the 1950s, which developed from the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Pairing archival records with an online movie database, I first establish that being named during committee proceedings had significant negative impacts on victims. The committee also had a broader chilling effect on political themes in film. Qualitative and quantitative evidence shows how Congress partnered with radical anti-communist groups to enforce and grow the lists, through pressure campaigns that threatened boycotts and picketing. As a result, the lists primarily impacted visible onscreen talent. That these efforts were significantly more effective than past attempts by non-governmental groups highlights the role of politicians in empowering civil society. My results have implications for how even strong democratic institutions can be misused.
Can politicians in democracies punish citizens for political beliefs, despite civil liberties protections? If so, how? I argue that politicians partner with radical non-governmental groups for the purpose of political suppression. I test this theory with evidence from the ``Hollywood Blacklist" of the 1950s, which developed from the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Pairing archival records with an online movie database, I first establish that being named during committee proceedings had significant negative impacts on victims. The committee also had a broader chilling effect on political themes in film. Qualitative and quantitative evidence shows how Congress partnered with radical anti-communist groups to enforce and grow the lists, through pressure campaigns that threatened boycotts and picketing. As a result, the lists primarily impacted visible onscreen talent. That these efforts were significantly more effective than past attempts by non-governmental groups highlights the role of politicians in empowering civil society. My results have implications for how even strong democratic institutions can be misused.
Repression and Cultural Memory: Individual-Level Evidence from Argentina
[Working paper available on request]
Recent literature establishes that authoritarian repression has long-term political effects at both the individual and community level. I extend this research by documenting how repression influences the politics of memory. I argue that individuals targeted by the dictatorship should engage more in activities aimed at addressing the authoritarian past, due to both individual motivation and structural factors. I test this theory in the case of Argentina, by matching archival data on repression with IMDb information on careers. I provide evidence that artists targeted by the government were more likely to produce movies and television that addressed the authoritarian past post-democratization. These results are not only due to ideology: results persist even when considering only artists deemed by the secret police to have similar ideological backgrounds. My findings demonstrate how repression shapes the production of national memory at the individual-level.
Recent literature establishes that authoritarian repression has long-term political effects at both the individual and community level. I extend this research by documenting how repression influences the politics of memory. I argue that individuals targeted by the dictatorship should engage more in activities aimed at addressing the authoritarian past, due to both individual motivation and structural factors. I test this theory in the case of Argentina, by matching archival data on repression with IMDb information on careers. I provide evidence that artists targeted by the government were more likely to produce movies and television that addressed the authoritarian past post-democratization. These results are not only due to ideology: results persist even when considering only artists deemed by the secret police to have similar ideological backgrounds. My findings demonstrate how repression shapes the production of national memory at the individual-level.
The Audience of Repression: Killings and Disappearances in Pinochet's Chile
[Working paper]
Authoritarianism literature emphasizes that repression suppresses dissent, while co- optation builds support. This paper theorizes that repression can serve not just to eliminate opposition, but to appeal to supporters. I argue that regimes can use political killings to justify rule, by demonstrating a danger to the state that requires authoritarian controls to manage. I test this with evidence from Chile, where the military government enjoyed support on the basis of fighting an exaggerated communist threat. Original data on the regime’s 3,000 victims shows that killings were more likely in high-support areas – wealthy, conservative districts – but targeted suspicious individuals, signaling a direct threat to supporters. Evidence additionally shows that repression increased in high-support areas following a negative shock to support; public arrests were more likely in high-support districts; and the regime fabricated subversive activities to inflate threat. By incorporating authoritarian supporters, this research improves our understanding of subnational patterns of violence.
Authoritarianism literature emphasizes that repression suppresses dissent, while co- optation builds support. This paper theorizes that repression can serve not just to eliminate opposition, but to appeal to supporters. I argue that regimes can use political killings to justify rule, by demonstrating a danger to the state that requires authoritarian controls to manage. I test this with evidence from Chile, where the military government enjoyed support on the basis of fighting an exaggerated communist threat. Original data on the regime’s 3,000 victims shows that killings were more likely in high-support areas – wealthy, conservative districts – but targeted suspicious individuals, signaling a direct threat to supporters. Evidence additionally shows that repression increased in high-support areas following a negative shock to support; public arrests were more likely in high-support districts; and the regime fabricated subversive activities to inflate threat. By incorporating authoritarian supporters, this research improves our understanding of subnational patterns of violence.
Chileno: ¿Tú Eres Marxista? 1984